|
Climate policy has been held hostage to a tacit presumption that if saving a lot more energy were possible at an affordable price, it would already have been implemented. That's like an entrepreneur who abandons a good business idea because if it were sound, it would have been done earlier. All economists know that real markets are far from theoretical perfection. But most climate/economy models assume that almost all profitable energy savings must already have been boughtas if a perfect market did exist. On this basis, the modelers suppose, buying significantly bigger savings will be worthwhile only at higher energy prices. They then use big computer models to calculate how high an energy tax is needed (based on historic elasticities), how much that will depress the economy, and hence what the "cost" of protecting the climate must be. Those models have driven policy for the past two decades. Ever more elaborate models continue to be built on the same old assumptionthat saving energy isn't profitable at present prices and hence will require higher prices that will burden firms and the national economy. They're like a model, popular in the Reagan-Bush years, that trumpeted the notion that meeting the Toronto carbon-reduction goals would cost the U.S. about $200 billion a year. Yet the empirical evidence of what energy efficiency actually costs showed that reducing fossil fuel use that much would save the U.S. about $200 billion a year compared with buying and burning that fuel. Critics of climate protection often cast doubt on the elaborate computer models that simulate the physical processes of the earth's climate. Ironically, those physical models, which now closely fit the historic climate data, are far more detailed and realistic than the climate-economics models used to claim that climate protection is too costly. Pervasive barriers to buying energy efficiency, described below, make those economic models' perfect-market theory as otherworldly as if the physical climate models omitted atmosphere, clouds, and oceans. Ignoring real-world conditions leaves most of the climate-economics models riddled with flaws. For example,
In sum, most economic modelsespecially the extreme ones publicized by fossil-fuel companies' intensive ad campaigncalculate large costs because they assume rigid, constrained, and unintelligent responses to economic signals. The few models that show economic benefit from protecting climate, even if they assume outmoded energy-efficiency techniques and impute no value to reducing carbon or other pollution, merely assume that people and firms behave with the ordinary sagacity and flexibility that market mechanisms offerand can therefore adopt new techniques that can save far more energy, at far lower cost, at far greater speed, than most theorists can imagine. 1 But with localized spurts, like New England's 6%/y gains during 1978-80 (the period of the second oil shock). To be sure, national improvements were much faster before the 1986 price crash than since, but if a lower-than-historic rate is to be assumed because greater energy efficiency will continue to lower energy prices, then the stimulative effect of that cheaper energy, and the resulting faster turnover of capital stocks, must also be considered. 2 Manne, A.S. & Richels, R.G. 1990: "The Costs of Reducing U.S. CO2 Emission: Further Sensitivity Analyses," En. J. 11(4):6978. 3 OTA 1991: "Changing by Degrees: Steps to Reduce Greenhouse Gases: Summary," OTA-0-482, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC; Evans, J.C., ed. 1992: Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Academy Press, Washington DC, Academy Press, Washington DC, summarized by Rubin, E.S. et al., "Realistic Mitigation Options for Global Warming," Science 257:148ff, 10 July 1992.; IPPC 1996: The Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Vol. 3 of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 1995:IPPC Second Assessment Report, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England; Interlaboratory Working Group 1997: Scenarios of U.S. Carbon Reductions: Potential Impacts of Energy Technologies by 2010 and Beyond, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Berkeley CA) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge TN), LBNL-40533, ORNL-444 September, available at www.ornl.gov/ORNL/Energy_Eff/CON444. 4 Krause, F. 1996: "The Cost of Mitigating Carbon Emissions: A Review of Methods and Findings from European Studies," En. Pol. 24(10/11):899915; 5 Lovins, A.B. 1995: "The Super-Efficient Passive Building Frontier," condensation of Centenary address, ASHRAE J. 37(6):7981, June, RMI Publication #E95-28, www.rmi.org; Lovins, A.B. 1996: "Negawatts: Twelve Transitions, Eight Improvements, and One Distraction," En. Pol. 24(4), April, RMI Publication #U96-11, www.rmi.org. Lovins, A.B. 1996a: "Hypercars: The Next Industrial Revolution," Procs. 13th International Electric Vehicle Symposium (Osaka), October, RMI Publication #T96-9, www.rmi.org. 6 Newell, R.G., Jaffe, A., & Stavins, R. 1996: "Environmental Policy and Technological Change: The Effect of Economic Incentives and Direct Regulation of Energy-Saving Innovations," Working Paper, Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138; Grubb, M., Chapuis, T., & Duong, M.H. 1995: "The Economics of Changing CourseImplications of Adaptability and Inertia for Optimal Climate Policy," En. Pol. 23(4/5):417432. Goulder, L.H. & Schneider, S.S.1996: "Induced Technological Change, Crowding Out, and the Attractiveness of CO2 Emissions Abatement," working paper, Stanford University, Stanford CA. 7 Repetto, R. & Austin, D. 1997 at 2326: The Costs of Climate Protection: A Guide for the Perplexed, World Resources Institute, Washington DC, www.wri.org/wri/climate/. 8 Ibid. 9 Nordhaus, W.D. 1993: "Optimal Greenhouse Gas Reductions and Tax Policy in the 'DICE' Model," Am. Ec. Rev. 83(2):313317, Papers and Proceedings, May; Nordhaus, W.D. 1994: Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of the Greenhouse Effect, MIT Press, Cambridge MA; Nordhaus, W.D. & Yang, Z. 1996: "A Regional Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," Am. Ec. Rev. 86(4):741765, September; Jorgenson, D., Goettle, R., Gaynor, D., Wilcoxen, P., & Slesnick, D. 1995: "Social Cost Energy Pricing, Tax Recycling and Economic Change," August final report #68-W2-0018 to USEPA, Harvard University, Cambridge MA. 10 EPA's 1994 Emission Trends Report states that conventional energy use causes 95% of U.S. CO2 and NOX emissions, 73% of volatile organic compounds, and 70% of CO, so as The Economist remarked in June 1990, "Using energy in today's ways leads to more environmental damage than any other peaceful human activity." 11 IPCC 1996. op. cit. 12 Ekins, P. 1995: "Rethinking the Costs Related to Global Warming: A Survey of the Issues," Envir. Res. Ecs. 6(3):231277, Oct.; Jorgenson et al. 1995 op. cit., Boyd, R., Krutilla, K., & Viscusi, W.K. 1995: "Energy Taxation as a Policy Instrument to Reduce CO2 Emission: A Net Benefit Analysis," J. Envir. Ecs. Mgmt. 29:124; Statistics Norway 1995: Norwegian Emissions of CO2 198793: A Study of the Effect of the CO2-tax, Report 95/14, §10, Oslo. 13 Repetto & Austin 1997 op. cit.. Such a long-term change is quite small in annual terms: a review of nearly 100 modeling studies showed that holding long-term CO2 emissions at about current levels (much more stringent than current proposals for stabilizing emissions) "may if carried out in an efficient manner be expected to reduce average GNP growth rates over the period [to the mid-21st century] by less than 0.020.03% per year": Grubb, M., Edmonds, J., ten Brink, P., & Morrison, M. 1993 at 472: "The Costs of Limiting Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions: A Survey and Analysis," Ann. Rev. En. Envt. 18:397478.
|